From Hannola to Albain: The Rise and Fall of Ohio\u27s Hospital Agency by Estoppel Doctrine by Wigham, David J.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1991
From Hannola to Albain: The Rise and Fall of
Ohio's Hospital Agency by Estoppel Doctrine
David J. Wigham
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, From Hannola to Albain: The Rise and Fall of Ohio's Hospital Agency by Estoppel Doctrine, 39 Clev. St. L. Rev. 635 (1991)
FROM HANNOLA TO ALBAIN: THE RISE AND FALL OF
OHIO'S HOSPITAL AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................. 635
II. THE CHARITABLE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AND
ITS REPUDIATION 636
III. THE LEGAL DOCTRINES OF AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL AND
OSTENSIBLE AGENCY ........................................... 638
A. Public Policy Justifications Behind
Hospital Agency By Estoppel .............................. 639
B. Agency By Estoppel ......................................... 642
C. Ostensible Agency .......................................... 646
IV. VICARIOUS HOSPITAL LIABILITY IN OHIO ..................... 648
A. A History of Vicarious Hospital Liability
in O hio ....................................................... 648
B. Hannola v. City of Lakewood .............................. 649
C. Albain v. Flower Hospital .................................. 656
V. CONCLUSION ..................................................... 661
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of the hospital in the field of medicine has evolved significantly
in recent decades. Modern hospitals no longer merely house patients while
physicians practice medicine therein. They now provide a panoply of
sophisticated and high-quality medical services which require the skill
and expertise of many highly-trained professionals. Like any business
enterprise competing for market share, hospitals actively promote these
services by cultivating a reputation which portrays them as 24-hour full-
service medical institutions.'
What was once a clear line of demarcation concerning employment
status of the treating professional has been considerably blurred. Patients
now look to the hospital for emergency medical treatment, and typically
receive care from a series of medical professionals whose employment
relationships with the hospital are unknown. 2 This does not pose a prob-
lem until a patient is injured by the substandard care of an independent
physician who was selected by the hospital to treat the patient, and the
hospital is joined as a defendant in the ensuing lawsuit. In such a situ-
ation, hospitals, contrary to the public image they have fostered, privately
distance themselves as far as possible from the acts of the negligent
physician.3 In such instances, courts have intervened in recent years and
I See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
2 See Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 690 (Cal. 1944).
3 See Jeffrey S. Leonard, Note, Independent Duty of a Hospital to Prevent Phy-
sicians' Malpractice, 15 ARIZ.L.REV. 953, 953 (1973).
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expanded the scope of vicarious hospital liability to forbid hospitals from
holding out medical services to the public, while privately placing secret
limitations on tort liability that bind the unknowing patient.
This Note will begin with a brief history of vicarious hospital liability.
Next, it will examine the elements of two doctrines which are being used
to impute such liability to hospitals - agency by estoppel and ostensible
agency, also known as apparent agency - and determine how each has
been applied by courts across the nation to the hospital in general and
the hospital emergency room in particular. Building upon this discussion,
the focus will shift to Ohio case law. In particular, there are two seminal
cases which represent Ohio's acceptance of hospital agency by estoppel
and its subsequent abrogation respectively: Hannola v. City of Lakewood4
and Albain v. Flower Hospital.5 This Note will explore Hannola and ex-
amine how it comports with the core of reasoning concerning agency by
estoppel. Next, Albain will be scrutinized in order to discern why it de-
parted so drastically from the consensus ofjurisdictions on this issue, and
whether its conclusion was justified.
II. THE CHARITABLE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AND ITS REPUDIATION
Historically, hospitals were shielded from tort liability at common law
by the Charitable Immunity Doctrine, 6 which originated in mid-19th
century England.7 The Charitable Immunity Doctrine barred the appli-
cation of liability under respondeat superiore to hospitals for the negligent
4426 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
6 553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990).
6 See, e.g., Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914)
(hospitals were not liable for the torts of salaried medical professionals). The
Charitable Immunity Doctrine has also been referred to as "professional skill"
immunity. See Themins v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 637 P.2d 155,158 (Or.
Ct. App. 1981).
7See The Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Clark Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep.
1508 (1846).
.1 Respondeat superior is Latin for the maxim, "let the master answer." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1179 (6th ed. 1979). The legal doctrine of respondeat superior
holds a master liable for the torts of his servant committed within the scope of
employment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958). The test to
determine liability is whether the employer had the right to control the physical
conduct of the employee's work; if so, liability follows. See Councell v. Douglas,
126 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ohio 1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219. A
major exception to this rule involves the employer-independent contractor rela-
tionship, which states that an employer is not liable for the torts committed by
an independent contractor. See Councell, 126 N.E.2d at 599; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 409 (1958). However, there are three major exceptions to the
independent contractor rule as well. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411.
An employer cannot avoid liability for the tortious conduct of independent con-
tractor under the following circumstances: (1) when the independent contractor
is performing certain non-delegable duties as prescribed by law, id. at § 416; (2)
negligent hiring and retention of independent contractors, id. at § 411; and (3)
through agency by estoppel and ostensible agency, Johnson v. Wagner Provision
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acts of its paid employees, thus preventing any pecuniary recovery by
injured patients.
There were many policy reasons behind this doctrine. Some of the more
prominent included: (1) hospitals did not actively treat patients; they
merely housed patients while doctors provided medical services;9 (2) hos-
pitals were predominantly non-profit institutions, so it was improper to
apply respondeat superior because they derived no benefit from the phy-
sicians' services; 10 (3) because hospitals relied heavily on donations and
volunteer help, any exposure to tort liability would threaten their eco-
nomic well-being; 1 and (4) under the theory of "implied waiver," recipi-
ents of donated medical services from the hospital impliedly waived their
right to recover damages upon acceptance thereof.
12
Hospitals' immunity from tort liability however was not absolute. The
courts created a distinction between the performance of administrative
acts and medical acts by hospital employees. 13 Liability was imposed for
negligence involving purely administrative acts under the rationale that
such acts involved the daily operation of the hospital, and not the actual
practice of medicine. Personnel who performed such acts were treated as
servants of the hospital, thus triggering liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.14
Both the Charitable Immunity Doctrine and the administrative med-
ical act dichotomy have been abolished in the majority of states across
Co., 49 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1943); Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co., 34 N.E.2d 202
(Ohio 1941); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF AGENCY § 267 (agency by estoppel); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (ostensible agency). Independent staff phy-
sicians are considered to be independent contractors. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF AGENCY § 233, Comt. a.
9 Note, Theories For Imposing Liability Upon Hospitals For Medical Malprac-
tice: Ostensible Agency and Corporate Liability, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 561,
563-64 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Theories For Imposing Liability].
10 See, e.g., Taylor v. Protestant Hosp. Ass'n, 96 N.E. 1089, 1090 (Ohio 1911),
overruled by Avellone v. St. John's Hosp. 135 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio 1956).
"See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp. 105 N.E. at 92 (N.Y.
1914), overruled by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). See also William
H. Payne, Recent Developments Affecting A Hospital's Liability for Negligence of
Physicians, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 389, 390 (1977); Note, Theories For Imposing Liability,
supra note 9, at 561 n.9.
12 See, e.g., Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 82 P.2d 849 (Idaho
1938), overruled by, Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp. 297 P.2d 1041
(Idaho 1956); St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 144 N.E. 537 (Ind. 1924); Forrest v.
Red Cross Hosp., 265 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1954); Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
The theory of implied waiver is seriously flawed. First, patients never consent
to negligent medical treatment. Second, most patients pay for medical treatment
at non-profit hospitals, so in reality they are not receiving charitable services.
See Leonard, supra note 3, at 955 n.9.
'" See Payne, supra note 11, at 396; Gregory T. Perkes, Note, Medical Mal-
practice - Ostensible Agency and Corporate Negligence, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 551,
554 (1986).
14 See. e.g., Jones v. City of New York Hosp., 134 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 143 N.Y.S.2d 628 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955) (hos-
pitals are not liable for the medical malpractice performed by any physician, but
are responsible for all administrative acts).
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the country.16 Hospitals are now subject to vicarious liability under a
number of doctrines, including respondeat superior, non-delegable duties
and agency by estoppel. This trend reflects a judicial response to the social
and economic realities of the evolution hospitals have undergone in the
last thirty years. The genesis of this change is seen most notably in the
landmark case Bing v. Thunig.'6 Modern hospitals are now institutions
which provide high-quality medical services, and are in a position to
adequately protect themselves from tort liability with liability insur-
ance. 17 This has led to a shift away from the traditional family doctor
and the house call, and toward the full-service hospital.'8
III. THE LEGAL DOCTRINES OF AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL
AND OSTENSIBLE AGENCY
This section will examine two exceptions to the independent contractor
rule - the doctrines of agency by estoppel and ostensible agency - which
have been adopted by courts in recent years to hold hospitals liable in
tort actions for the negligence of their staff physicians. Included in this
analysis will be a general explanation of the two doctrines, the public
15 See Payne, supra note 11, at 390.
16 143 N.E.2d 3, (N.Y. 1957) (repudiated both the Charitable Immunity Doc-
trine and the administrative/medical act dichotomy). This famous quote from
Bing perhaps best described the alchemy of the modern hospital.
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient,
does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes
instead simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no
longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals ... do far more than furnish
facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large
staff of physicians, nurses and interns, as well as administrative and manual
workers, and they charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting
for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the person who
avails himself of "hospital facilities" expects that the hospital will attempt
to cure him, not that its nurses or their employees will act on their own
responsibility.
Hospitals should ... shoulder the responsibilities borne by everyone else.
There is no reason to continue their exemption from the universal rule of
respondeat superior. The test should be ... whether charitable or profit-
making, as it is for every other employer, was the person who committed
the negligent act one of its employees and, if he was, was he acting within
the scope of his employment.
Id. at 8. Accord Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Mich.
1978); Themins v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 637 P.2d 155, 158 (Or. Ct.
App. 1981); Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 974-75 (Wash. Ct. App.
1978).
17 See Moore v. Bd. of Trustees, 495 P.2d 605, 608 (Nev. 1972) (hospitals are
becoming community centers in response to public demand) cert. denied, 409 U.S.
879 (1972). See also Leonard, supra note 3, at 953.
18 See Keith B. Hunter, Comment, Medical Malpractice By Emergency Physi-
cians and Potential Hospital Liability, 75 KY.L.J. 633, 635 (1986).
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policy reasons behind their application to the hospital setting, and an
exploration of the individual elements of each doctrine. Last, the doctrines
of agency by estoppel and ostensible agency will be compared and con-
trasted in order to determine precisely how they have been so confused
by the courts and thus used so interchangeably.19
A. Public Policy Justifications of
Hospital Agency By Estoppel
Pursuant to this legal trend toward vicarious hospital liability, courts
have extended tort liability to situations in which independent physicians
were held out by the hospital as its agents or employees to patients who
sought treatment from the hospital. Specifically, two very similar and
often indistinguishable doctrines - agency by estoppel and ostensible
agency - have been used to impute tort liability upon a hospital despite
the fact that it had no right to control the actions of the independent
physician. 20
The emergency room, in particular, has been a primary source of ex-
posure to vicarious hospital liability under agency by estoppel, although
it has been applied to other areas of the hospital as well.21 This is due to
the fact that the emergency room represents a vital link between the
community and the hospital, and offers essential and often life-saving
medical services.2 2 When hospitals hold themselves out as providers of
'" See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, (Alaska 1987). The court stated,
"Although courts and commentators often use these terms interchangeably, they
are not theoretically identical." Id. at 1380. See also Diane M. Janulis & Alan D.
Hornstein, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Hospitals' Liability for
Physicians'Malpractice, 64 NEB. L. REV. 689, 696-97 (1985); David A. Beal, Note,
Judicial Recognition of Hospital Independent Duty of Care to Patients: Hannola
v. City of Lakewood, 30 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 711, 722-23 n.74 (1981).
20 The doctrines of agency by estoppel and ostensible agency are exceptions to
the independent contractor rule whereby a principle is liable for independent
contractors it holds out as its own agents or employees. See supra note 8.
2 See, e.g., Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1377. Agency by estoppel and ostensible agency
have been applied to a panoply of hospital independent contractors, including
anesthesiologists, surgeons, pathologists, psychiatrists, radiologists, and cardiol-
ogists. See, e.g., Gregg v. Nat'l. Medical Health Care Serv., 699 P.2d 925, 927-28
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (negligence of cardiologist who failed to diagnose the extent
of a patient's complications charged to the hospital); Quintal v. Laurel Grove
Hosp., 397 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1964); Seneris v. Haas, 291 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1955) (cases
where hospitals were held vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent
anesthesiologist); Howard v. Park, 195 N.W.2d 39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (hospital
liability for the malpractice of an independent surgeon); Lundberg v. Bay View
Hosp., 191 N.E.2d 821 (Ohio 1963) (hospital liable for negligence of an inde-
pendent pathologist), overruled on other grounds by Oliver v. Kaiser Community
Health Found., 449 N.E.2d 438 (Ohio 1983); Simmons v. St. Clair Memorial Hosp.,
481 A.2d 870, 877 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (hospital which held out an emergency
psychiatrist held liable for a patient who committed suicide in the hospital); Beeck
v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153, 1158-59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (liability
imputed to the hospital for a radiologist's negligence).
22 "The emergency department, recognized as one of the hospital's more com-
plex, crucial, and changeable services, is now regarded as a major rather than
an ancillary service." Steven E. Pegalis & Harvey F. Wachsman, Emergency Room
Negligence, TRIAL, May 1980, at 50.
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such important services while in reality secretly contracting them out,
the courts have determined that it is against public policy to allow hos-
pitals to escape tort liability.23
The public policy justifications behind the imposition of agency by es-
toppel and ostensible agency focus on the economics of the hospital as a
business entity, but also reflect an attempt to abate the increase of in-
cidents of medical malpractice in recent years.24 First, there is a public
policy consideration known as the enterprise liability theory, which in-
volves the proper allocation of risks in operating a business.25 This theory
of enterprise liability employs the premise that a business must bear
those costs of production attributable to the operation thereof. Otherwise,
the enterprise would receive a de facto public subsidy by passing off part
of the risks inherent to that particular business to the public.
Hospitals benefit from the appearance of being "full-service" providers
of medical care, an integral part of which is the operation of an emergency
room. Many patients requiring long-term care come to the hospital
through emergency room doors.2 6 Thus, the presence of an emergency
room enhances other departments of the hospital. In addition, there are
tax-exemptions available to the hospital for the operation of an emergency
room which serve to minimize the losses realized by treating the unin-
sured.2 7 Since hospitals derive benefits from an emergency room, it is
deemed fair that hospitals bear all the inherent risks in its operation,
and not be permitted to contract away the inevitable tort liability.
A second foundation for liability originates from the rationale for the
application of vicarious liability in general. Specifically, when two in-
nocent parties incur a loss at the hands of a third party, the loss should
fall on the party who created the circumstances which led to it.28 This
See Hunter, supra note 18, at 635. As hospitals have modernized, they have
contracted out specialized services with outside professionals.See Note, Theories For Imposing Liability, supra note 9, at 562 n.7.
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) (Cmt. to subsection 1); W.
PROSSER, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 499, 500 (5th ed. 1984); Guido Calabresi,Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499,(1961); See also Claire G. Combs, Note, Hospital Vicarious Liability for the Neg-ligence of Independent Contractors and Staff Physicians: Criticisms of Ostensible
Agency in Ohio, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 711, 717 (1987).26 See Hunter, supra note 18, at 634 n.9. The percentage of a hospital's total
admissions which arrive through the emergency room varies, depending on the
nature and demographic location of the hospital. In inner-city hospitals about90% of all admissions arrive through the emergency room. For private hospitals
with elective admission, the emergency room accounts for approximately 20% of
all admissions.
27 See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 501(c)(3). See also Nancy R. Levin, Hos-pital's Liability for Independent Emergency Room Service, 22 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 791, 792 (1982).
28 See Fullerton v. Sturges, 4 Ohio St. 529 (1855). "[T]he rule is founded ...
which casts the loss, when one of two equally innocent persons must suffer, uponhim who has put it in the power of another to do the injury." Id. at 535. See also
3 OHIO JUR.3D, Agency § 55 (1978).
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often occurs when the independent physician's insurance policy is inad-
equate to cover the malpractice claim. When the patient incurs an injury
as a result of negligence by an independent physician, the hospital should
absorb the loss rather than the patient because the hospital created the
appearance of an agency relationship which contributed to the loss. The
availability of the hospital as an additional defendant ensures that the
plaintiff will be fully compensated. Because liability under respondeat
superior is joint and several, the hospital has the right to seek indem-
nification from the negligent physician. An ancillary benefit of the in-
demnification process is that it deflects the underlying issue of
compensation to the two culpable parties, i.e., the two defendants. The
pressures surrounding the issue of loss-bearing require hospitals to
closely scrutinize the conduct of their present physicians, and become
increasingly circumspect about future physicians with whom they may
contract.
A third reason for holding hospitals vicariously liable involves an at-
tempt to reduce incidents of medical malpractice by creating an additional
defendant as a source of compensation. Rather than minimizing occur-
rences of malpractice by denying a plaintiff the reasonable opportunity
to recover, the legal system must ensure that less malpractice occurs in
the hospital itself. Hospitals are in a unique position to control the quality
of medical care which takes place in their institutions. Imposing direct
independent liability on hospitals will serve as a deterrent and will force
hospitals to assume a more active role in providing quality medical treat-
ment.
29
Most of the criticism surrounding agency by estoppel and ostensible
agency cites the "deep pockets" theory as the actual reason for the im-
position of vicarious hospital liability.3 0 This critique however misses the
See Leonard, supra note 3, at 968. Changes likely to occur include the revision
of hospital by-laws, closer scrutiny of the peer review system, and more active
participation of the hospital's Board of Directors in medical matters. Id. at 968
n.73. But cf. OHIO REV. CODE § 4731.41 (1989):
No person shall practice medicine or surgery, or any of its branches without
a certificate from the state medical board; no person shall advertise or
announce himself as a practitioner of medicine or surgery or any of its
branches, without a certificate from the board; no person not being a licensee
shall open or conduct an office or other place for such practice without a
certificate from the board; no person shall conduct an office in the name of
some person who has a certificate to practice medicine or surgery, or any
of its branches; and no person shall practice medicine or surgery, or any of
its branches, after a certificate has been revoked, or, if suspended, during
the time of such suspension.
Id. In this circumstance, the effect of the statute is to limit the degree to which
hospitals may participate in the practice of medicine, and to force them to defer
to the private physician regarding purely medical decisions. See Ruth B. Dangel,
Comment, Hospital Liability for Physician Malpractice: The Impact of Hannola
v. City of Lakewood, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 1077, 1083 (1986).
30 See H. Ward Classen, Hospital Liability For Independent Contractors: Where
Do We Go From Here?, 40 ARK. L. REV. 469, 495 (1987); Combs, supra note 25, at
717.
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underlying public policy behind exposing hospitals to liability. Critics are
quick to blame the problem of skyrocketing liability insurance on the
legal mechanism, which merely allocates liability to the culpable phy-
sician or institution. 31 Instead of merely passing on these increased costs
to the consumer and reacting in horror as malpractice awards soar,32
hospitals should take the necessary steps to reduce substandard care when
their names begin to appear on case captions of the complaints filed by
the injured patients.
B. Agency By Estoppel
The doctrine of agency by estoppel is an exception to the independent
contractor rule. It holds hospitals liable for the negligence of independent
staff physicians who work therein, despite the fact that the hospital had
no right to control the mode and manner of their conduct.33 Under the
doctrine of agency by estoppel, if a hospital represents to a patient that
an independent physician is its agent, and the patient relies on such
representations to her detriment, the hospital is estopped from denying
that the independent physician is its agent.34
A source upon which courts often rely for the elements of agency by
estoppel is the Restatement of Agency, § 267 which sets forth that:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent
and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the
care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the
third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the
one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were
such .35
31 See Combs, supra note 25, at 723; Comment, Dangel, supra note 29, at 1085.
32 See Classen, supra note 30, at 469 n.2.
33 See supra note 8.
See infra note 35.
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 267 (1958) (emphasis added). The fol-
lowing cases involve vicarious hospital liability and cite § 267 with approval:
Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1380 (Alaska 1987); Street v. Washington Hosp.
Ctr., 558 A.2d 690, 692 (D.C. 1989); Irving v. Doctors Hosp. of Lake Worth, Inc.,
415 So.2d 55, 58 (Fla. 1982); Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Brown, 361 S.E.2d
164, 166 (1987); Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ky. 1985);
Williams v. St. Claire Medical Ctr., 657 S.W.2d 590, 595 (Ky. 1983); Mehlman v.
Powell, 378 A.2d 1121, (Md. 1977); Themins v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd.,
637 P.2d 155, 159 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d
970 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978); Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial Hosp., 423 N.W.2d 848,855 (Wis. 1988) (cited §§ 429 & 267 with approval and then applied a common
law test which contains the element of reliance). Cf. Vanaman v. Molford Mem-
orial Hosp., Inc., 272 A.2d 718, 722 (Del. 1970) (approving Restatement § 267
and acknowledged the "holding out" theory, but finding that the facts were in-
sufficient to support the conclusion). But see Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d
1038 (Ohio 1990) (Albain is an aberrational decision which is discussed in detail
infra, notes 125-160 and accompanying text).
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The two primary elements of agency by estoppel most often applied by
courts to the hospital emergency room setting are: (1) a representation
by the hospital that the independent physician is an agent of the hospital,
(2) which causes a patient to rely to her detriment on the apparent
agency.,6
The majority of courts have not interpreted the first element so nar-
rowly as to mean that the hospital must make an affirmative or express
representation to an emergency room patient that her treating doctor is
an employee of the hospital.37 Rather, courts have uniformly decided that
a "holding out" of the physician by the hospital suffices as a represen-
tation. Also, this representation may be made to the public at large.38
In accordance with this interpretation, several factors common to the
emergency room setting have been recognized by many courts to deter-
mine whether such a holding out has actually occurred. Virtually every
jurisdiction looks to see whether the patient looked to the hospital for
treatment rather than her personal physician.39 Some of the other prom-
inent factors include: (1) whether the hospital furnished everything nec-
essary for medical treatment except for the physician's actual services;
40
(2) whether the treatment occurred in the hospital;41 (3) whether the
-6 See, e.g., Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1980).
3 See Themins, 637 P.2d at 159. "An express invitation was not required." Id.
See also Paintsville, 683 S.W.2d at 256:
[T]he cases applying the principle of ostensible agency to the hospital/emer-
gency room physician situation, without exception, do not require an express
representation to the patient that the treating physician is an employee of
the hospital, nor do they require direct testimony as to reliance. A general
representation to the public is implied from the circumstances.
(emphasis added).
See also Pamperin, 423 N.W.2d at 856. It is important to note here that Paints-
vile mislabeled the doctrine it was utilizing as "ostensible agency." Because it
cited to Restatement § 267 and required a reliance element, Paintsville was ap-
plying agency by estoppel. See Paintsville, 683 S.W.2d at 257.
a6 See, e.g., Adamski, 579 P.2d at 979. A holding out occurs "when the hospital
acts or omits to act in some way which leads the patient to a reasonable belief
he is being treated by the hospital or one of its employees." Id.
39The important distinction is whether or not there was a pre-existing phy-
sician-patient relationship. If not, the patient has no knowledge of the status of
her treating physician, and is justified in assuming the physician is an agent of
the hospital. See Jackson 743 P.2d at 1380; Vanaman, 272 A.2d at 721; Street,
558 A.2d 690, 692; Richmond, 361 S.E.2d at 166; Paintsville, 683 S.W.2d at 258;
Williams, 657 S.W.2d at 596; Mehlman, 378 A.2d at 1124; Grewe v. Mt. Clemens
Gen. Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Mich. 1978); Howard v. Park, 501, 195 N.W.2d
39, 41 (1972); Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So.2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985); Weldon v.
Seminole Mun. Hosp., 709 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Okla. 1985); Smith v. St. Francis
Hosp., 676 P.2d 279, 282 (Okla. 1985); Capan, 430 A.2d at 649; Adamski, 579
P.2d at 975; Pamperin, 423 N.W.2d at 857. See also Combs, supra note 25, at 715;
Perkes, supra note 13, at 561.
'o This occurs often in emergency room settings. The assumption is that if the
hospital provides the facility and all necessary drugs, equipment and support
personnel, it must be providing the physician as well. See Quintal v. Laurel Grove
Hosp., 397 P.2d 161, 169 (Cal. 1964).
41 See Mehlman, 378 A.2d at 1124; Howard, 195 N.W.2d at 41; Adamski, 579
P.2d at 978 (citing Howard).
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hospital provided the physician with an office at the hospital; 42 (4) whether
the hospital chose for and supplied to the patient the treating independent
physician;43 and (5) whether the hospital itself billed the patient for the
physician's services.44 The existence of any number of these factors
amounts to a "general representation to the public,' 4 5 an open invitation,46
or a representation by implication, and fulfills the first element of agency
by estoppel.
To satisfy the second element of agency by estoppel - that the patientjustifiably relied to her detriment on the appearance of an apparent
agency - the courts have developed various observations which comport
with the public's reasonable beliefs and expectations concerning emer-
gency room physicians and their relationship to the hospital. The follow-
ing assumptions amount to objective standards by which the courts scru-
tinize whether the reliance of the individual patient was reasonable andjustified.47 The ultimate import of these assumptions is that detrimental
reliance is often inferred from the actions and statements of the patient. 4
First, the public is generally uninformed of the employment status of
emergency room professionals and it presupposes that such professionals
are agents or employees of the hospital. 49 One court even went so far as
to take judicial notice of this fact.50 Second, courts impose no legal duty
upon emergency room patients to inquire about or to be aware of this
contractual relationship between the physician and the hospital.51 In fact,
many courts have stated that "[it would be absurd to require such a
patient to be familiar with the law of respondeat superior and so to inquire
of each person who treated him whether he is an employee of the hospital
42 The logical assumption is that if the physician has an office at the hospital,
he is employed by the hospital. See, e.g., Street, 558 A.2d 690, 692. See also Funk
v. Hancock, 498 N.E.2d 490 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (listed as a controlling factor
the fact that the doctor was on the Board of Directors at the hospital).
43See Jackson 743 P.2d at 1380; Grewe, 273 N.W.2d at 433; Howard, 195 N.W.2d
at 41; Hardy, 471 So.2d at 371; Adamski, 579 P.2d at 978 (citing Howard).
If the patient receives a bill on the hospital's letterhead, it is a reasonable
assumption that the physician is the hospital's agent. See Quintal, 397 P.2d at169; Howard, 195 N.W.2d at 41; Adamski, 579 P.2d at 978 (citing Howard).
, See, e.g., Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Ky. 1985).46See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 Cmt. A (1957).
47 See, e.g., Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Brown, 361 S.E.2d 164, 166 (Ga.
1987).
4 See Street v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 558 A.2d 690, 692 (D.C. 1989), 692(general representation is implied from the circumstances). See also Paintsville,
683 S.W.2d at 256.
- See Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976);Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Mich. 1978) (citing Bing);Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. Low Div. 1979);
Paintsville, 683 S.W.2d at 258.
50 See Arthur, 405 A.2d at 447. 'This court may take judicial notice that gen-
erally people who seek medical help through the emergency room facilities of
modern-day hospitals are unaware of the status of the various professionals work-
ing there." Id. (footnote omitted).
51 See Seneris v. Haas, 291 P.2d 915, 927 (Cal. 1955); Howard v. Park, 195
N.W.2d 39; Themins v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 637 P.2d 155, 159 (citingSeneris). See also Combs, supra note 25, at 715; Payne, supra note 13, at 561.
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or an independent contractor. ' 52 Third, patients who seek emergency med-
ical treatment look to the hospital and not the independent physician for
care. 53 This expectation reflects the public's recognition of the increased
role hospitals have assumed in the medical industry.54 Given these as-
sumptions by the public concerning emergency room professionals and
their treatment, it is almost axiomatic that the courts infer that a patient
justifiably relied to her detriment and impose liability.55 Accordingly,
most plaintiffs prevail by pleading and proving their ignorance of the
complex relationships between the myriad of professionals from whom
they have received medical care and the hospital, the entity to which the
patient looked for such care.
56
Courts have found further justification for their interpretations of the
elements of agency by estoppel and their subsequent applications to the
hospital emergency room setting in Illustration 1 to Restatement § 267,
which sets forth as follows:57
P, a taxi-cab company, purporting to be the master of the drivers
of the cabs, in fact enters into an arrangement with the drivers
by which the drivers operate independently. A driver negli-
gently injures T, a passenger, and also B, a person upon the
street. P is not liable to B. If it is found that T relied upon P
as one furnishing safe drivers, P is subject to liability in an
action of tort.
5
8
Hence, the taxicab company, by merely holding out its taxicabs to the
public, has created the impression to its passengers that the independent
drivers are its agents. A passenger detrimentally relies on this represen-
tation by soliciting a ride with the company and subsequently receiving
an injury through the driver's negligence. The hospital emergency room
setting is extremely analogous. Hospitals purport to the public that they
52 Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)
(citations omitted). See also Seneris, 291 P.2d at 927; Howard, 195 N.W.2d at 41-
42; Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 978 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1380 (Alaska 1987) (citations omitted);
Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Brown, 361 S.E.2d 164, 166 (Ga. 1987); Edmonds
v. Chamberlain Memorial Hosp., 629 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
See Capan, 430 A.2d at 649; Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957).
See also supra notes 16 & 22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 48.
See supra note 39.
s See Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Brown, 361 S.E.2d 164, 166 (Ga.
1987)(cited with approval the Restatement illustration of the taxicab company).
r- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267, illus. 1 (1958). See Richmond, 361
S.E.2d at 166. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267, cmt. a. 'The
rule normally applies where the plaintiff has submitted himself to the care or
protection of an apparent servant in response to an invitation from the defendant
to enter into such relations with such servant." Id. In the hospital setting, hos-
pitals extend ongoing and continuous invitation to the public to submit themselves
to the care and protection of their emergency rooms.
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are full-service institutions, an essential part of which is the operation
of emergency room services. The public, relying on this representation,
looks to the emergency room for treatment and is furnished with an
independent physician by the hospital. If the patient is negligently in-
jured, it can be found that she relied upon the hospital to provide her
with a competent employee. In such a situation, it makes sense to hold
the hospital liable for creating the appearance of an apparent agency.
C. Ostensible Agency
Ostensible agency is a common law doctrine which imputes an agency
relationship to a principal who, through an act or omission, causes a third
party to reasonably believe that an independent contractor is the agent
of the principal. 5 Ostensible agency is "steeped in principles of estoppel" °
and is often used in estoppel situations, even though it requires a less
stringent standard than that of agency by estoppel in that detrimental
reliance by the third party is not necessary to create ostensible agency.
The landmark case with respect to ostensible agency is Hill v. Citizens
National Trust & Savings Bank of Los Angeles6' which provides the fol-
lowing elements of ostensible agency:
(1) The person dealing with the agent must do so with the belief
in the agent's authority and this belief must be reasonable; (2)
such belief must be generated by some act or neglect of the
principal sought to be charged; and (3) the third person relying
on the agent's apparent authority must not be guilty of neg-
ligence.6 2
Another popular source looked to by the courts for the elements of
ostensible agency is Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 which sets forth
that:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform serv-
ices for another which are accepted in the reasonable belief
that the services are being rendered by the employer or by his
servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the
19 See infra note 62.
60 Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843, 850 (N.D.Ga. 1981).
- 69 P.2d 853, 855 (Cal. 1937). See also Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 397
P.2d 161, 169 (Cal. 1964); Seneris v. Haas, 291 P.2d 915, 927 (Cal. 1955); Grewe
v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429,434 (Mich. 1978); Adamski v. Tacoma
Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 978 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). These cases cite the elements
of Hill with approval. See also Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic,
128 P.2d 705, 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (courts occasionally cite this case as a
source for Hill's elements of ostensible agency).
Hill, 69 P.2d at 855.
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negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the
same extent as though the employer were supplying them him-
self or by his servants. 3
In the context of hospital emergency rooms, the courts have recognized
the elements of ostensible agency as (1) an omission which causes (2) a
reasonable belief that an agency relationship exists.6 To satisfy the first
element, the courts examine the conduct of the hospital to look for a
holding out, and invariably use an analysis identical to that of the first
element of agency by estoppel. Furthermore, the courts apply the same
factors common to the emergency room which demonstrate a holding out
at the same conclusion.
6 5
The second element of ostensible agency demands that the emergency
room patient form a justifiable belief based on the acts or omissions of
the hospital that her treating physician was an agent of the hospital. It
calls for a lower standard for liability than its counterpart in agency by
estoppel because it does not require a nexus between the two elements;
i.e., the patient is not required to change her position in reliance on the
conduct of the hospital. Accordingly, a patient's reasonable beliefs are
often inferred by the courts by applying expectations of the public's rea-
sonable beliefs to each factual setting.
66
It is the identity between the elements of agency by estoppel and os-
tensible agency and the applications thereof which has led courts to con-
fuse the two doctrines, and to employ them virtually interchangeably.
67
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1958). Many state supreme and
appellate courts have cited to § 429 for the elements of ostensible agency. See
Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1380 (Alaska 1987); Irving v. Doctors Hosp. of
Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So.2d 55, 58 (Fla. 1982); Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So.2d 358,
370 (Mis. 1985); Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 446; Mduba v. Bene-
dictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Smith v. St. Francis
Hosp., 676 P.2d 279, 282; Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 648
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Pamperin v. Trinity Hosp., 423 N.W.2d 848, 855 (Wash.
1988).
See, e.g., Adamski, 579 P.2d at 979.
6 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. Note that the first element
of ostensible agency calls for a lower standard for liability than its agency by
estoppel counterpart. Whereas agency by estoppel demands some representation,
ostensible agency calls for any act or omission. Thus, by merely omitting some
key facts which the public in general or the patient in particular should have
known, the hospital may incur liability.
Courts employ the same assumptions as to the public's perceptions of and
duties to hospital emergency rooms. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying
text.
67 The principal difference between ostensible agency and agency by estoppel
involves whether there is a nexus between the conduct of the hospital and that
of the patient. See Janulis & Hornstein, supra note 19, at 670. With ostensible
agency, the primary focus is on the conduct of hospital: did the hospital's actions
create an apparent agency. The patient need only formulate a reasonable belief
based on such an agency. In contrast, agency by estoppel requires a connection
between the representations of the hospital and the reliance of the patient; i.e.,
did the patient actually change his position based on the conduct of the hospital.
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Inevitably, the majority of jurisdictions arrive at identical results with
either doctrine, making the blur between the two doctrines more of a
legal technicality than a critical judicial oversight.-
IV. VIcARIous HosPITAL LIABILITY IN OHIO
In 1981, Ohio courts joined the growing number of jurisdictions which
have utilized agency by estoppel in the hospital emergency room context.
In a decision squarely in line with the majority of jurisdictions, an Ohio
appellate court in Hannola v. City of Lakewood"9 found that agency by
estoppel was applicable in this context. This case promulgated a nine-
year line of concurring cases from nearly every Ohio appellate division
until the Ohio Supreme Court interceded in 1990 with a heretofore un-
precedented interpretation of hospital agency by estoppel in Albain v.
Flower Hospital.70 This section will explore the evolution of vicarious
hospital liability in Ohio with a focus on the two cases which most sig-
nificantly impacted Ohio's application of agency by estoppel to the hos-
pital-physician relationship.
A. A History Of Vicarious Hospital Liability In Ohio
Before 1956, the Charitable Immunity Doctrine was alive, but hardly
well, in Ohio. It previously had been eroded by a number of cases, the
result of which left hospitals with only partial immunity.71 In 1956, the
Charitable Immunity Doctrine was completely abrogated by the Ohio
Supreme Court in Avellone v. St. John's Hospital.72 The court in Avellone
Id. Identical conclusions are reached with either doctrine because when a patient
has submitted herself for emergency room treatment based on a holding out of
the hospital, courts infer reasonable reliance, which presupposes that a reasonable
belief existed. The same conclusions are reached because the analysis of agency
by estoppel must travel through that of ostensible agency.
Many jurisdictions have applied the elements of agency by estoppel under
the auspices of ostensible agency or apparent agency. E.g., Pamperin v. Trinity
Hosp., 423 N.W.2d 848 (Wisc. 1988). Thus, they are unwittingly applying the
stricter estoppel standard, but nevertheless imposing liability.
426 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
70 553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990).
71 See Taylor v. Protestant Hosp. Ass'n, 96 N.E. 1089 (Ohio 1911) (granted
complete charitable immunity to non-profit hospitals). But see Sisters of Charity
of Cincinnati v. Duvelius, 173 N.E. 737 (Ohio 1930) (liability imposed on a non-
profit hospital for the negligence of the hospital's elevator operator); Taylor v.
Flower Deaconess Home and Hosp., 135 N.E. 287 (Ohio 1922) (liability imposed
on a non-profit hospital for failure to use ordinary care in the selection of its
servants).
72 135 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio 1956). Avellone overruled the following cases: Taylor,
96 N.E. 1089; Rudy v. Lakeside Hosp., 155 N.E. 126 (Ohio 1926); Lakeside Hosp.
v. Kovar, 2 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio 1936) (in part). See also Klema v. St. Elizabeth's
Hosp. of Youngstown, 166 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1960) (a non-profit hospital is liable
for the negligence of its employees, regardless of whether said acts are admin-
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held that a non-profit hospital is liable for the torts of its servants under
the doctrine of respondeat superior.73 Avellone paved the way for cases
like Lundberg v. Bay View Hospital7 4 which represents the first Ohio
case to apply principles of estoppel to the hospital context. Specifically,
Lundberg held that a hospital was estopped from denying responsibility
for the negligent acts of a pathologist where the hospital "by its conduct"
represented that the physician was its employee.
75
B. Hannola v. City of Lakewood
In Hannola v. City of Lakewood'76 the Ohio Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Appellate District held that a genuine issue of material fact ex-
isted as to whether a hospital was vicariously liable for the medical
malpractice of an independent physician which occurred in the hospital's
emergency room. The Hannola court applied three legal theories to find
that liability may exist: respondeat superior, non-delegable duty, and
agency by estoppel. Because this Note does not challenge any other the-
ories of vicarious hospital liability, this analysis will focus exclusively on
Hannola's application of the doctrine of agency by estoppel.
Hannola involved a case of emergency room negligence not unlike other
cases from the majority of jurisdictions which have adopted agency by
estoppel. 77 In Hannola, the patient arrived at Lakewood Hospital requir-
ing emergency room treatment and died allegedly as a result of negligence
which occurred at the hands of a physician-employee of West Shore Med-
ical Care Foundation .7 The executrix of the decedent's estate brought an
action against the hospital and the City of Lakewood in addition to the
physician, alleging that Lakewood Hospital had created an appearance
that the physician was an agent of the hospital and that the decedent
istrative or medical). See also OrIo REV. CODE § 2743.02(2)(B) (1989) (legislative
codification of the repudiation of the Charitable Immunity Doctrine insofar as all
government hospitals are concerned). The code states:
The state hereby waives the immunity from liability of all hospitals owned
or operated by one or more political subdivisions and consents from them
to be sued, and to have their liability determined, in the court of common
pleas, in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between
private parties, subject to the limitations set forth in this chapter.
Id.
73 Avellone, 135 N.E.2d at 414. The Avellone court examined three theories
upon which Ohio had historically relied to grant charitable immunity to hospitals:
(1) the trust fund theory; (2) the implied waiver theory; and (3) a general public
policy theory. Id. at 413. See also supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. Next,
the court, by recognizing the legal, societal and economic realities of the changing
role of hospitals, distinguished each theory. Id. at 414-17. See also supra note 16
and accompanying text.
74 191 N.E.2d 821 (Ohio 1963).
75 Id. at 823.
76426 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
77 See supra note 35.
78 Hannola, 426 N.E.2d at 1188. West Shore Medical Care Foundation was an
independent professional organization with whom the City of Lakewood had con-
tracted to furnish emergency room services at the hospital. Id.
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relied on such an appearance.7 9 Lakewood Hospital and the City of Lake-
wood filed motions for summary judgment, claiming that they were not
liable for the doctor's negligence because he was an independent con-
tractor.80 The lower court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, and the plaintiff appealed."'
In finding that issues of fact existed as to whether the independent
physician was the apparent agent of Lakewood Hospital, the Hannola
Court stated that the hospital "held itself out" as a full-service institute,
an essential component of which was the emergency room, and that the
public was not informed otherwise. 82 It was the patient's lack of knowl-
edge, combined with his submission for treatment by the physician fur-
nished by the hospital, which formed the basis of the reliance. Hannola
properly observed that the public assumes that an emergency room is
part of a hospital, when in reality, frequently such is not the case.8 3 The
emergency room in this case was actually West Shore Medical Care Foun-
dation, not Lakewood Hospital.
In its decision, the Hannola Court examined Ohio's common-law stand-
ards of agency by estoppel found in a line of cases involving the mercantile
trade;8 specifically, Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co. 5 and Johnson v. Wag-
ner Provision Co.8 In Rubbo, the Ohio Supreme Court held that agency
by estoppel exists where a proprietor advertises goods for sale at his store,
a customer relying on the advertisement purchases said goods, and is
injured thereby only to find that the store was leased to another.8 7 In such
a case, the proprietor is estopped to deny that the lessor is not his agent."M
Rubbo, quoting Globe Indemnity Co. v. Wassman,9 explicitly qualified
the representation element by stating that:
Representations need not be made to the plaintiff directly, but
that "it is sufficient if the representation is made to a third
person to be communicated to the plaintiff, or to be commu-
nicated to a class of persons of whom the plaintiff is one, or
even if it is made to the public generally with a view to its being
acted on, and the plaintiff as one of the public acts on it and
suffers damage thereby."9
79 Id.
S0Id.
81 Id. at 1189.
'2 Id. at 1190.
Hannola, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
" It is interesting to note that the court applied only existing Ohio -v, and
did not look to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 267 (1957) fo, agency
by estoppel standards. But see Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio
1990) (The Albain court used § 267 in conjunction with Ohio case law.).
34 N.E.2d 202 (Ohio 1941).
8849 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1943).
87Rubbo, 34 N.E.2d at 203.
8Id.
89 165 N.E. 579 (Ohio 1929) (statements made at a public meeting are repre-
sentations if they induce a change of position by the claimants).
Rubbo, 34 N.E.2d at 205 (emphasis by Rubbo). This quote was originally
made by Judge Quain of the Queens' Bench in Swift v. Winterbotham, 8 L.R.,
Q.B. 244 (18721873).
[Vol. 39:635
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol39/iss4/9
AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL
Thus, Rubbo allows for general representations made by the principal
which were directed to the public, rather than requiring specific repre-
sentations, or representations to the particular plaintiff. In Johnson, the
Ohio Supreme Court applied a similar standard to that of Rubbo by
stating that a customer's reliance may be induced by an advertisement.
Johnson also distinguished ostensible agency.9 1 "The doctrine of agency
by estoppel ... rests upon the theory that one has been led to rely upon
the appearance of agency to his detriment. It is not applicable where
there is no showing of induced reliance upon an ostensible agency. '92
Hannola interpreted Rubbo and Johnson to find that the hospital's
holding out to the public of emergency room services satisfied the first
element of agency by estoppel.93 Specifically, the Hannola Court stated
that "[bly calling itself a 'hospital' and by being a full-service hospital
including an emergency room as part of its facilities, an institution makes
a special statement to the public when it opens its emergency room to
provide emergency care for the public."9 4
Hannola also stated that the hospital created the appearance to the
public that an agency relationship existed.9 5 When this fact is coupled
with a patient's lack of meaningful choice, which is limited to the most
proximate hospital, and the facility's selection of the treating physician,
induced reliance by the patient is present, therefore satisfying Johnson.
It is important to note that the standard contained in Rubbo is more
narrow than that of Hannola. Although the same principal elements of
representation and reliance are present in the former cases, the repre-
sentations by the principal in Rubbo were express in that there were
advertising campaigns directed to the public. Hannola involved the cre-
ation of the appearance of an agency through an open invitation to the
public and by providing everything except the actual services.96
Hannola's interpretation of agency by estoppel cannot be viewed as
over-expansive, however. The advertising characteristics of the mercan-
tile and hospital industries are easily distinguishable. While both in-
dustries make public statements to attract business, the two entities
employ different means to achieve their results. The nature of the hospital
emergency room is such that massive advertising campaigns simply are
not necessary.
First, there is virtually no competition for emergency room services.
The existence of such medical services is structured according to regional
or territorial demands which directly relate to proximity to the hospital.
In spite of this, hospitals strive to maintain a degree of visibility within
91 Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co., 49 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ohio 1943).92 Id. at 926.
11 Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
941d.
9
5 Id.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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a community.97 For example, private hospitals cultivate their reputations
for high quality medical services by actually advertising their services."
Non-profit hospitals also achieve a degree of visibility in the community
through events like fundraising drives, public service campaigns, and
community relations programs.9 9 All these acts serve as public statements
which enhance the hospital's reputation for high-quality emergency room
treatment, but are hardly of the nature and degree utilized in the mer-
cantile industry.
Second, the emergency room patient often does not have a choice of
hospitals; the closest facility is often the most desirable. Hannola found
this fact to be an important public policy concern.'00 In contrast, the
consumer of a mercantile concern has an opportunity to choose from many
enterprises. In both scenarios, the hospital patient and store consumer
have been induced to rely on the presence of an agency relationship. In
the latter, the consumer's reliance led her to patronize the particular
store and to her injury. In the former, because the public has no mean-
ingful choice concerning emergency room treatment, a patient must rely
on the hospital to furnish a physician. Accordingly, it becomes all the
more imperative that hospitals are what they purport to be, and not be
allowed to secretly isolate themselves from liability. The fact that the
patient would not have sought treatment from another hospital is not
important; what is significant is the fact that the patient sought and
expected treatment from an employee of the hospital, not an independent
physician. What is more, the hospital patient is possibly staking her life
on this appearance of agency created by the hospital. Therefore, the re-
liance standard of Hannola is well within the ambit of Rubbo, considering
its context.
The court in Hannola also distinguished itself from a case decided by
the Ohio Supreme Court which addressed vicarious hospital liability and
the issue of agency by estoppel: 1 1 Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincin-
nati, Inc..10 2 In Cooper, the court dismissed the case against all defendants,
including the hospital, on their motion for a directed verdict because
proximate cause was not demonstrated by the plaintiff.10 3 Specifically,
the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the
patient probably would have survived had the treating physician properly
diqgnosed his condition. 10 4 Thus, the agency by estoppel issue was pre-
- See, e.g., Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So.2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985). "We notice a
marked increase in advertisement and other forms of solicitations of patients as
hospitals compete for the health-care dollar." Id. See also Leonard, supra note 3,
at 967.
98 Leonard, supra note 3, at 967.
SId.
- Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E. 2d 1187, 1190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
101 Id. at 1192-93 n.2.
102 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971).
103 Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 104.
104 Id.
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empted and became moot because there was no liability. Accordingly,
Cooper did not perform a protracted analysis of the issue, although it did
acknowledge the doctrine of agency by estoppel at the end of the case in
dicta: "[Tihe practice of medicine by a licensed physician in a hospital is
not sufficient to create an agency by estoppel, as alleged by appellant.
Nowhere is 'induced reliance' shown by appellant, as required by Johnson
v. Wagner Provision Co. .... to establish such a relationship."'
0 5
Hannola set forth two grounds which demonstrated that it was not an
impermissible departure from Cooper.106 First, there was a procedural
distinction between the two cases in that Cooper involved a motion for a
directed verdict and Hannola a motion for summary judgment. Although
Hannola did not explicitly point this out, the standards for motions for
a directed verdict and summary judgment are identical: there must be
an absence of any genuine issue of material fact.107 After review of the
record, Hannola determined that "there remain significant issues of fact
to be determined on the issue of... induced reliance ... ."101 However,
in Cooper, the plaintiff made no showing in accordance with the induced
reliance standard of Johnson. Although the same theory of liability was
used - agency by estoppel - it is wrong to presuppose that the plaintiffs
in each case relied upon and pleaded identical facts. Hence, the conclusion
in Cooper that induced reliance can never be shown by a hospital is a
non-sequitur, and there is no conflict between Hannola and Cooper: a
plaintiff must make a showing that she was induced to rely on the holding
out by the hospital in order to establish that a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to agency by estoppel.' °9
Second, Hannola observed that Cooper did not consider all pertinent
public policy issues; specifically, that patients were induced to rely on the
reputation of full-service hospitals which had emergency rooms on the
premises.110 This argument flows logically from Hannola's first distinc-
,05 Id. See also Freeman v. Holzer Medical Ctr., No. 88-CA-22, 1989 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3834 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1989); Griffin v. Matthews, 522 N.E.2d 1100,
1102 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Funk v. Hancock, 498 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ohio Ct. App.
1985); Stratso v. Song, 477 N.E.2d 1176, 1186 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Hannola v.
City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1193, n.2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980). These cases
observed that because the Supreme Court's argument did not proceed past the
proximate cause argument, the agency by estoppel argument in Cooper was mere
dicta. Even so, the courts still looked for induced reliance when examining the
records in summary judgment proceedings concerning claims of agency by estop-
pel. See Hannola, 426 N.E.2d at 1189; Funk, 498 N.E.2d at 495.
I6 Hannola, 426 N.E.2d at 1193 n.2.
7 See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (as cited in Combs, supra
note 25, at 723).
108 Hannola, 426 N.E.2d at 1193.
109 See, e.g., Freeman 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 3834, at *6 (the plaintiff presented
evidence which tended to prove induced reliance). But see, e.g., Combs, supra note
25, at 723 (wrongly assumed that Cooper stood for the proposition that a showing
of induced reliance could never be made rather than fact that the plaintiff merely
did not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to induced reliance).
110 Hannola, 426 N.E.2d at 1193.
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tion: because Cooper dismissed the case on the proximate issue and only
stated in dicta that the plaintiff did not show induced reliance, it was
never obligated to address the public policy arguments.
Another important fact which further distances Hannola from Cooper
is that the Ohio Supreme Court overruled all petitions to certify the record
in Hannola, and thereby gave it tacit approval."' If the Court had felt
there was any conflict between the two cases, it had ample opportunity
to review the record of Hannola and overrule it. But because the court
remained silent, the only logical inference is that the court felt the two
cases were compatible.
Lastly, it must be pointed out that Hannola concurred with the Cooper
statement that "the mere practice of medicine by a licensed physician in
a hospital is not sufficient to create an agency by estoppel." 112 This is
axiomatic. Hospitals, pursuant to the general rule concerning independ-
ent contractors, are not held vicariously liable for the negligence of any
independent physician. 11 3 But because of the unique circumstances sur-
rounding the operation of an emergency room, namely that there is no
preexisting physician-patient relationship, hospitals often create an ap-
parent agency with an independent contractor who injures a patient.
Thus, liability should follow accordingly.1 1
4
Further solidifying Hannola is the line of cases from other Ohio courts
of appeal which have adopted Hannola's application of agency by estop-
pel. 115 One leading case is Stratso v. Song." 6 Stratso approved of Hannola,
"I See Freeman 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 3834, at *5 (observed that the court
also refused to certify the records of Stratso and Funk).
112 Hannola, 426 N.E.2d at 1193.
13 See supra note 8.
14 See supra note 8.
115 See Nicholson v. Landis, No. 1404, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1121 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 27, 1990); Freeman v. Holzer Medical Center, No. 88-CA-22, 1989 Ohio
App. LEXIS 3834 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1989); Mason v. Labig, No. 87-CA-91,
1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 2596 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 1989); Tompkins v. McGinnis,
No. CA-88-36, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 2746 (Ohio Ct. App. June 27, 1989); Fer-
guson v. Allied Anesthesia, Inc., No. 88AP-483, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 1831
(Ohio Ct. App. May 16, 1989); Whitlow v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 536 N.E.2d 659
(1987); Goodman v. Mercy Hosp., No. 13-85-3 (3d App. Dist. Dec. 12, 1986); Funk
v. Hancock, 498 N.E.2d 490,490 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Stratso v. Song, 477 N.E.2d
1176 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). Compare Griffin v. Matthews, 552 N.E.2d 1100, 1100
(Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (recognized agency by estoppel, but opined that no induced
reliance was shown because plaintiff did not demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact in relying on the affidavit of the director of the paramedic services.
The court felt that an affidavit from a paramedic who actually transferred the
patient, or from any family member, would have created an issue of fact con-
cerning induced reliance). But see Smith v. Timken Mercy Medical Center, No.
CA-6006 (5th App. Dist. Feb. 8, 1983) (court held that Hannola did not apply,
and refused to extend agency by estoppel to all physicians who were granted staff
privileges. The court concurred with Cooper and Hannola in that "the mere prac-
tice of medicine by a licensed physician is not sufficient to create an agency by
estoppel." Smith, slip op. at *5 (citing Hannola, 426 N.E.2d at 1190 n.2)).
116 477 N.E.2d 1176 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). Stratso involved the alleged negli-
gence of an anesthesiologist which caused the patient to suffer brain damage and
chronic hepatitis due to massive blood loss. Id. at 1180.
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and then extended it outside the emergency room to hold that a hospital
who induces a patient to rely on an independent contractor-anesthesiol-
ogist is estopped to deny that an agency relationship existed. 1 7 Stratso
also held that demonstrating induced reliance is a factual issue, which
enables a plaintiff to withstand a motion for summary judgment on the
reliance issue by submitting evidence as to her personal beliefs and state-
ments concerning the hospital. 1 8 Furthermore, the Stratso Court em-
braced Hannola's concept of induced reliance. In particular, the patient
who looked to the hospital for medical care relied on the hospital's choice
of anesthesia services because such services appeared to be furnished by
the hospital." 9
Another prominent Ohio appellate court case which acknowledged Han-
nola was Funk v. Hancock.120 The Funk court expanded Hannola by hold-
ing that material facts existed as to whether a hospital may be held
vicariously liable for the negligence of a consulting physician called in
by the emergency room physician."' The Funk Court found the following
facts to be dispositive: (1) that the hospital provided the physician for the
patient; and (2) that the physician maintained staff privileges at and
served on the board of directors of the hospital.
22
In short, Hannola's interpretation of agency by estoppel in the context
of hospital/emergency room malpractice falls squarely in line with the
overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions which have addressed the topic. 23
It recognizes the disparity between the public perception of the hospital
emergency room fostered by hospitals, and the consequences to the in-
dividual patient of the secret contractual reality between the hospital
and the emergency room. It also acknowledges that sound public policy
should dictate that hospitals be barred from escaping vicarious liability
through such hidden contractual relationships. Furthermore, in the line
of cases in Ohio which confronted the issue of agency by estoppel, all but
one appellate district have concurred with Hannola, despite the fact that
they were not bound by Hannola and were free to decide otherwise.
2 4
When the majority of jurisdictions across the nation and Hannola's pro-
geny are considered, there is but one possible conclusion: Hannola was
decided consistently with the proper interpretation of the doctrine.
117 Id. at 1186. Applying agency by estoppel to areas of the hospital outside the
emergency room, especially to the anesthesiologist, is not uncommon. See also
supra note 21.
"I Id. at 1186.11 Id. at 1187.
120 498 N.E.2d 490 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). In Funk, the treating physician neg-
ligently cast a compound fracture of the patient's arm without debridement and
sufficient follow-up treatment, which resulted in the arm being amputated. Id.
at 492.
121 Id. at 495.
122 Id.
12 See cases cited supra notes 35, 39 and 63.
124 See Smith v. Timken Mercy Medical Ctr., No. CA-6006, slip op. at 5 (5th
App. Dist. Feb. 8, 1983).
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C. Albain v. Flower Hospital
In Albain v. Flower Hospital,125 the Ohio Supreme Court rejected Han-
nola and thereby significantly narrowed the application of agency by
estoppel in the context of hospital emergency room relationships. 12 Spe-
cifically, Albain held that a plaintiff must prove that the hospital made
express representations which led her to believe that an independent
physician was an agent working under the hospital's authority, and that
she justifiably relied to her detriment on such representations. 127 In ad-
dition, the court repudiated Hannola's application of the doctrine of res-
pondeat superior,12 and Hannola's imposition upon hospitals of a
nondelegable duty to assure the absence of negligence in the medical
treatment provided by its staff physicians. 129 Albain preserved the duty
of a hospital to "exercise of due care in the granting of staff privileges,
and the continuation of such privileges."30 Again, the discussion of this
case will be confined to the issue of agency by estoppel.
Albain involved a fact-pattern typical of many emergency room liability
cases. An out-of-town patient who was eight months pregnant, Sharon
Albain, was experiencing episodes of vaginal bleeding, and looked to
Flower Hospital for emergency medical care. 1 ' The hospital supplied her
with an on-call independent physician, whose alleged negligent treatment
resulted in the asphyxiation death of the patient's full-term fetus.' 3 2
The plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against the hospital as well
as the independent physician, claiming that the physician was the ap-
parent agent of the hospital. 33 The trial court granted the hospital's
motion for summary judgment, but the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed,
stating that issues of material fact existed as to whether there was an
agency relationship between the hospital and the independent physi-
cian.13 4 The case came before the Ohio Supreme Court upon a motion to
certify the record.
125 553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990).
126 Id. at 1044.
127 Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1049-50.
128 Id. at 1044. Specifically, Albain rejected Hannola's theory that hospitals
reserve the right to control the mode and manner of the physical acts of their
staff physicians, and thus are liable under respondeat superior. See supra note 8.
129 Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1048. Albain referred to the application of this non-
delegable duty as a "misdirected attempt to circumvent the necessity of proving
agency by estoppel .. . ." Id. at 1047. Hannola imposed this duty while also re-
cognizing that "the mere practice of medicine in a hospital by a doctor ... is not
of itself sufficient to create an agency by estoppel." Hannola v. City of Lakewood,
426 N.E.2d 1187, 1193 n.2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980). Arguably, these two notions are
incompatible.
"
0 Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1046.
1" Id. at 1040.
132 Id. at 1041.
133 Id. at 1041.
134 Id. at 1042.
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In its decision, the Ohio Supreme Court in Albain acknowledged the
emergence across the country of the application of agency by estoppel to
the hospital emergency room. It observed that most jurisdictions which
have decided the issue have used as an underpinning either the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 429 or the Restatement (Second) of Agency §
267.13r Albain chose to apply the stricter standard found in Restatement
§ 267, in addition to looking to the Ohio line of agency by estoppel cases:
Rubbo and Johnson.
136
The Albain Court criticized Hannola for treating the language of Cooper
like dicta by offering a rather attenuated interpretation of Cooper.13 7 The
specific passage in Cooper to which Albain referred stated that "the prac-
tice of medicine by a licensed physician in a hospital is not sufficient to
create an agency by estoppel, as alleged by the appellant. Nowhere is
'induced reliance' shown by the appellant, as required by Johnson v.
Wagner Provision Co. ... to establish such a relationship."13 8
Albain, in effect, reinterpreted Cooper so as to say that only under very
rare circumstances can an agency by estoppel relationship be created in
a hospital. One major flaw in this interpretation is that Cooper explicitly
restricted the scope of its analysis to the allegations of the appellant by
qualifying each sentence. 139 In particular, Cooper said that an agency by
estoppel was not created as alleged by the appellant and the induced
reliance was not shown by the appellant.40 This implies that agency by
estoppel is applicable to cases involving hospital emergency room neg-
ligence by independent physicians, but that it was not shown in this
case.14' In essence, by reinterpreting Cooper, the court waylaid Hannola.
By waiting nine years before overruling it, Albain allowed an entire line
of appellate court cases to evolve, and then recognized a tenuous and
result-oriented reading of Cooper to create a conflict with Hannola.
Next, Albain condemned Hannola for holding that induced reliance can
be implied in virtually every case. 142 In particular, Albain set forth that
the pertinent statement in Hannola - "the mere existence of a hospital
with emergency room facilities constitutes an inducement that all its
physicians therein are acting under the hospital's control and direction"'
43
131 Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1048. See supra notes 35 & 63 and accompanying
text.
136 Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1049. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
13 Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1049. Cooper devoted two sentences on the last page
of the opinion to the issue of agency by estoppel. See Cooper v. Sisters of Charity,
Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1971).
13 Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 104 (citation omitted).
139 Id. Cooper has been distinguished from Hannola on many other grounds.
See supra notes 106-114 and accompanying text.
140 See Stratso v. Song, 477 N.E.2d 1176, 1186. "In Cooper, the patient person-
ally consulted with the specific doctor involved. The question then became who
did the patient select as a physician: the hospital, or the physician group which
provided emergency-room services pursuant to the contract with the hospital."
Id. at 1187.
141 See Stratso, 477 N.E.2d at 1187; Funk v. Hancock, 498 N.E.2d 490, 495
(Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
142 Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1049 (Ohio 1990).
4 Id. at 1049.
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- was inconsistent with the statement in Cooper that "the mere practice
of medicine by a licensed physician in a hospital is insufficient to create
an agency by estoppel."'-
The problem with this argument is twofold. First, it ignores the fact
that the emergency room setting is a drastic departure from the typical
hospital-independent physician situation where patients enter the hos-
pital for medical treatment from their personal physician. In the latter
situation, patients are fully apprised of the relationship between the
hospital and their treating physician and, more importantly, they select
the physician who performs the procedure. In contrast, the emergency
room setting is unlike any other hospital function. Patients usually enter
the emergency room looking to the hospital for treatment, and all ap-
pearances in the hospital confirm this. 146 Moreover, time and circum-
stances often preclude a patient from learning otherwise. In effect, Albain
ignores the factors developed by the majority of courts which distinguish
between the emergency room setting, and the private patient-physician
relationship.
Second, this argument refuses to acknowledge the public's expectations
and assumptions of hospital emergency room relationships applied by
most state courts in this area. 146 These assumptions and duties comprise
the objective standards by which an individual patient's subjective reli-
ance is measured. The social reality is that the general public is not
aware of the contractual relationship between the hospital and its emer-
gency room physicians, and should not be obligated to so inquire. 147 There-
fore, it is reasonable to imply inducement in the context of hospital
emergency rooms where a plaintiff pleads and proves facts which fall
under the rubric of the objective standard.
Finally, Albain provided the elements of agency by estoppel as they
apply to hospital emergency rooms. 148 The court found that in order to
hold a hospital vicariously liable for the torts of its independent emer-
gency room physicians under agency by estoppel, a plaintiff must dem-
onstrate that: "(1) the hospital made representations leading the plaintiff
to believe that the negligent physician was operating as an agent under
the hospital's authority; 149 and (2) the plaintiff was thereby induced to
144 d.
145 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. (factors given by other state
courts which lead people to rely on hospitals).
141 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
14 See supra notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text.
148Albain, 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1049 (Ohio 1990).
149Albain cited two cases as authority for the first element of agency by es-
toppel: Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co., 49 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1943); and Grewe
v. Mt. Clemens General Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429, 434 (Mich. 1978). The court's use
of Johnson is not surprising in that it has long been a source for Ohio's standards
for agency by estoppel. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
However, the appearance of Grewe is somewhat mysterious in that Grewe is
a landmark case which espouses an interpretation of hospital agency by estoppel
which is completely antithetical to that of Albain. In Grewe, the Supreme Court
of Michigan upheld a jury verdict based on facts substantially similar'to those
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rely upon the ostensible agency relationship.' 150 Albain dichotomized the
reliance element by stating that the issue is not whether the patient
relied on the reputation of the hospital, but whether she relied on the
representations of the hospital.' 5'
in Albain. Grewe, at 431. A patient suffering from a dislocated shoulder sought
medical treatment from the emergency room at Mt. Clemens General Hospital,
and was negligently treated by the on-duty independent emergency room phy-
sician. Id.
The Grewe Court held that a hospital can be held liable under agency by
estoppel where a patient looked to the hospital itself for treatment and the hospital
represented to her that medical treatment would be provided by doctors working
therein. Id. at 433. In Grewe the dispositive factor was that the hospital furnished
the patient with the independent physician. Id. Thus, through its omissions, the
hospital represented to the patient that the independent physician was an agent
thereof.
By citing this case as an authority for the representation element, Albain
seems to be giving back what it had just taken away from Hannola; i.e., by using
Grewe as a reference, Albain approved of the exact scenario it had rejected in
Hannola one paragraph supra! All that a hospital need do to satisfy the first
element of agency by estoppel pursuant to Grewe is select and provide the treating
physician to an emergency room patient who looked to it for treatment. This is
exactly what happened in Albain. Sharon Albain, an out-of-town patient, looked
to Flower Hospital for emergency medical treatment and was thereby provided
a staff physician who negligently injured her. Albain, at 1040-41. This is supported
in the record by her allegation that she believed upon her arrival to the hospital,
"that Flower Hospital would provide me with a physician." Id. at 1050. The use
of Grewe as authority for this first element of agency by estoppel may invariably
lead to myriad of interpretations as the lower courts attempt to decipher Albain.
'50 Albain, at 1049.
51 Id. at 1049-50. The court further stated that reliance rarely exists in an
emergency room situation, and elaborated:
Patients rarely, if ever, would elect to receive emergency medical care at a
particular hospital based on the contractual arrangement between the hos-
pital and staff physicians. Most probably, a hospital is typically chosen on
the basis of the geographic proximity of the emergency room to the injury.
* * * [A] person needing emergency care does not exercise deliberate and
informed choice or "shop around" for emergency medical care services. Nor
is the decision likely ever to be made based upon the employment structure
contained within the hospital. More often than not, the receiving hospital
is chosen by the driver of the emergency vehicle or private care conveyance
and the primary concern of all involved is to get to the closest hospital as
quickly as possible. The reputation of the hospital is likely only rarely
considered; rather, its convenience is the greatest consideration in the pa-
tient's mind, assuming the patient is even conscious at the time.
Id. at 1050 n.12 citing Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial Hosp., 423 N.W.2d 860, 860
(Wisc. 1988) (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
It is important to point out that this quote is from the dissent to Pamperin.
The Pamperin majority, in uniformity with virtually every jurisdiction in the
nation deciding the issue, interpreted the reliance element to agency by estoppel
as focusing on the patient's reliance on the hospital and its staff to provide medical
services, not on the treatment of the individual physician. Generally, patients
rely on the reputation of the hospital itself. Pamperin, 423 N.W.2d at 857.
Ironically, Pamperin quoted Grewe for the proposition that the paramount issue
is whether the patient was looking to the hospital for medical treatment. Pam-
perin, 423 N.W.2d 857. See supra note 39. Perhaps in lieu of citing to Grewe, it
might have been easier for the Albain Court to simply cite both the majority and
dissenting opinions of Pamperin. However, clarifying these issues as such would
have demonstrated both the Albain Court's confusion and the result-oriented
nature of its decision.
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The distinction of the reliance element amounts to a judicial fiction
because the reputation of a hospital consists of various representations,
actions and omissions made by the hospital which form the underpinning
of the public's beliefs concerning the hospital. In essence, a hospital's
reputation is a creation of its own public relations endeavors. 162 Allowing
a hospital to represent certain facts to the public and then secretly con-
tract otherwise is contrary to any interpretation of agency by estoppel."'
The effect of this is that emergency room patients are held to a higher
standard by ignoring the reasonable objective beliefs of the public con-
cerning the hospital emergency room.
Applying these elements to the facts of the case, Albain found that
there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sharon Albain
relied on an apparent agency relationship between Flower Hospital and
the independent physician."14 Specifically, Albain found the following
facts to be dispositive: (1) the plaintiff was transported to Flower Hospital
by paramedics solely because of its close proximity;155 (2) the plaintiff was
under the impression that Flower Hospital would furnish her with a
physician; 5 6 and (3) the treating physician never discussed her employ-
ment status with the patient."57 Thus, it held that Flower Hospital made
no representation to Sharon Albain which would induce her to believe
that her treating physician was its apparent agent.
Albain's interpretation of the representation element is unprecedented
and unduly restrictive. In order to satisfy this element the hospital would
have to expressly inform the patient that the treating physician was an
agent of the hospital. This element is virtually impossible to fulfill because
a hospital would never make such a damaging and false statement."58
Also, it refuses to recognize the reality that a hospital can induce reliance
through creating the appearance of an agency, and then omitting key
"'2See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
153 See cases cited supra notes 35, 39 and 63. These cases uniformly have held
hospitals liable under agency by estoppel by using the "holding out" theory.
- Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1050 (Ohio 1990).
115 Id. at 1050.
156 Id. According to the court, the plaintiff in this case may have erred in
pleading her allegations. Sharon Albain alleged that she thought "that Flower
Hospital would provide me with a physician." Id. The court distinguished this
statement by assuming that she "did not believe that a physician who was an
employee of the hospital would be provided her." Id. (emphasis original). The court
seems to be narrowly construing the evidence here in order to rebut the objective
standards maintained by many courts; specifically, that patients looking to the
hospital for medical care assume that the physician provided by the hospital is
an agent of the hospital. See supra notes 39, 49-53 and accompanying text.
117 Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1050.
161 The jurisdictions which have applied agency by estoppel have uniformly
held that a hospital which supplies an emergency room physician to a patient
who looked to the hospital for treatment is thereby holding the physician out as
its agent. See supra note 39. This is precisely what occurred in Albain.
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facts which would notify the patient otherwise. 159 No state court has ever
interpreted agency by estoppel in this manner. In fact, this holding ar-
guably contradicts the court's holding in Rubbo on the grounds that it
does not allow for representations to the public, a point which has been
well-settled for almost 120 years. 160
V. CONCLUSION
The core of logic that has emerged from the majority of states which
have applied the doctrine of hospital agency by estoppel has held hospitals
liable for holding out an independent physician to a patient who has
looked to the hospital for medical treatment, assumed the physician is
an agent of the hospital, and was not informed otherwise. Ohio concurred
with this line of reasoning with its Hannola decision, which promulgated
a line of concurring Ohio appellate decisions and stood for nine years
until it was severely limited by Albain. Albain represents an aberrational
decision. It cuts against other Ohio Supreme Court decisions on agency
by estoppel in addition to a well-established line of cases from other states
without any firm legal or public policy justifications.'5 '
169 See, e.g., Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 979 (Wash. 1978).
"A 'holding out' or representation may arise when the hospital acts or omits to
act in some way which leads the patient to a reasonable belief he is being treated
by the hospital by one of its employees." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Quintal v.
Laurel Grove Hosp., 397 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1964); Seneris v. Haas, 291 P.2d 915 (Cal.
1955); Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 128 P.2d 705 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1942) and Schagrin v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., 304 A.2d 61 (Del. 1973)).
- See supra note 90.
161 As of this writing, three Ohio appellate court cases have recently decided
the hospital agency by estoppel issue pursuant to the holding of Albain: Robinson
v. Portage Radiological Assocs., Inc., Accelerated Case No., 91-P-2323, Ohio App.
LEXIS 440 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1992); Justice v. City of Columbus, Case No.
91AP-675, Ohio App. LEXIS 5488 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1991); Barry v. Youngs-
town Osetopathic Hosp., Case No. 90 CA 145, Ohio App. LEXIS 4070 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 27, 1991); Latham v. The Ohio State University Hosp., No. 90AP-999,
1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1391 (Ohio Ct. App. March 26,1991); Maddox v. Brentwood
Hosp., No. 58239, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1182 (Ohio Ct. App. March 21, 1991);
and O'Neil v. Mahoning County Agricultural Society, No. 90CA-86, 1991 Ohio
App. LEXIS 968 (Ohio Ct. App. March 12, 1991). These cases applied Albain's
unduly restrictive standards to arrive at the same conclusion: a patient cannot
prevail upon a claim of hospital agency by estoppel until and unless she pleads
and proves facts which demonstrate that (1) the hospital made actual represen-
tations to her that the treating physician was its agent; and (2) the patient was
thereby induced to rely upon this apparrent agency.
In addition, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently held in favor
of the majority ofjurisdictions on this issue in Torrence v. Kusminsky, 408 S.E.2d
684 (W. Va. 1991). The Court in essence confirmed the thesis of this Note by
stating:
[T]he cases applying the principle of ostensible agency to the hospital/emer-
gency room physician situation, without exception, do not require express
representation to the patient that the treating physician is an employee of
the hospital, nor do they require direct testimony as to reliance. A general
representation to the public is implied from the circumstances. Without
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A quote from Hannola states: "Public outrage, and possibly even an
effect on admissions at a typical hospital, would surely follow a public
announcement by the hospital that it regards all staff doctors as com-
pletely independent professionals, conducts no supervision of their per-
formance, and takes no interest in their competence.' 16 2 Surely a similar
public outrage would follow given a public announcement that the Ohio
Supreme Court, by its decision in Albain, has further propagated this
apathy toward the public's emergency medical needs.
DAVID J. WIGHAM
exception, evidence sufficient to invoke the doctrine has been inferred from
circumstances similar to those shown in the present case, absent evidence
that the patient knew or should have known that the treating physician
was not a hospital employee when the treatment was performed (not af-
terwards).
Id. at 691 (quoting Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Ky.
1985)(emphasis added).
The Torrence Court also set forth a rather articulate rationale for holding a
hospital liable for holding out emergency room physicians.
We find the application of ostensible agency particularly compelling when
a patient seeks services from an emergency room. In such circumstances,
there is often no time to arrange for the services of a private physician,
and, in effect, the patient has no other choice but the emergency room.
Frequently, the situation is tense, with the patient's family and friends in
an emotional state. To hold that the hospital, after offering emergency room
services, should avoid any subsequent liability by claiming that those who
render such assistance are not the hospital's employees defies the logical and
reasonable expectations of those who seek such services.
409 S.E.2d at 692 (emphasis added).
Ironically, Torrence mistakenly cited Albain as a case being in line with the
overwhelming majority of courts which concur on this issue. Id. at 691. As this
Note demonstrates, such is hardly the case.
162Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E. 2d 1187, 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980)
(quoting Leonard, supra note 3, at 967).
[Vol. 39:635
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol39/iss4/9
